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UNPEELING THE GROWING SPLIT UNDER THE ATS: 
CARDONA V. CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.  
 
Anastasia Stylianou 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ application of the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) in 
its recent decision Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc.1 demonstrates a mechanical 
and restrictive application of the holding of the Supreme Court decision Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company.2 The Eleventh Circuit declared that none of the relevant conduct took place 
within the United States and thus, ruled that United States courts lacked the power to review the 
claims of over four thousand Colombians who sought to hold Chiquita Brands International 
(“Chiquita”) liable for the deaths of family members.3  
In March 2007, Chiquita pled guilty to a federal felony of knowingly providing material 
support to the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”), an illegal paramilitary organization 
notorious for its mass murder of Colombian civilians.4 Under the plea agreement, the Justice 
Department accepted Chiquita’s assertion that the support amounted to payment for protection 
and that Chiquita never received services in exchange from the AUC paramilitaries.5  It took four 
                                                 
1 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014). 
2 133 U.S. 1659 (2013). 
3 Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1188. 
4 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898). 
“Chiquita’s assistance to the AUC was a federal crime because the U.S. Government had officially designated the 
AUC a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ and a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist,’ and thus, a threat to the 
security of foreign policy of the United States.” Id. 
5 Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US banana firm hired Colombia paramilitaries, ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011 2:28 
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/20114813392621189.html. “No executives were charged 
under the deal, which was reached when Chiquita was represented by then-Covington & Burling LLP lawyer Eric 
Holder, now the U.S. attorney general.”  Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins Dismisssal of U.S. Suits on 
Colombia Torture, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (July 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-07-
24/chiquita-wins-dismissal-of-u-dot-s-dot-suits-over-colombia-torture. 
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years for the United States government to investigate Chiquita’s support for the AUC, which was 
“prolonged, steady, and substantial” — over seven years from 1997–2004.6  
Contrary to claims by Chiquita that these payments were extorted, internal company 
documents published by the National Security Archive (“NSA”), an independent research group, 
strongly suggested that the transactions provided specific benefits to Chiquita.7  By its own 
account, Chiquita paid the AUC $1.7 million and also “assisted the AUC in smuggling arms and 
ammunition with full knowledge that the AUC was a violent organization responsible for crimes 
against humanity.”8  Throughout the seven-year duration, 3,778 people were murdered in Uraba, 
with an additional 60,000 forced into what is now the second largest internally displaced 
population in the world.9 “The company, having knowingly and repeatedly approved transactions 
its own lawyers were flagging, also went to great lengths to disguise the payments, using special 
vocabulary in company accounting records and various intermediaries on the ground in 
Colombia,” but none of the dozens of high level officials who approved the payments have been 
prosecuted, nor have any reparations been paid to the victims.10  Chiquita executives classified 
the payments as “the cost of doing business in Colombia;” a cost that included a shipment of 
three thousand AK-47 assault rifles and five million rounds of ammunition.11  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
6 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898). 
7 Jim Lobe & Aprille Muscara, US banana form hired Colombia paramilitaries, ALJAZEERA (April 8, 2011 2:28 
PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/20114813392621189.html. The documents consist of more 
than 5,500 pages of internal Chiquita memos which “reinforce the claim…that the company was knowingly 
complicit I, and thus liable for, the atrocities committed by the AUC” while on the Chiquita payroll. Id. (quoting 
Arturo Carrillo, director of George Washington University’s International Human Rights Clinic). 
8 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 1–2, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898). 
“What makes this conduct so morally repugnant is that the company went forward month after month, year after 
year, to pay the same terrorists.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. At 29. 
9 Steven Cohen, How Chiquita Bananas Undermined The Global War on Terror, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 2, 2014 
2:45 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/world/2014/08/02/3466915/chiquita-colombia-ruling/.  
10 Id. 
11 Associated Press, Chiquita accused of funding Colombia terrorists, CBS NEWS (May 31, 2011 8:20 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/chiquita-accused-of-funding-colombia-terrorists/. In a 1997 handwritten note, one 
Chiquita executives said such payments are the “cost of doing business in Colombia. . . [n]eed to keep this very 
confidential—people can get killed.” Id.  
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Chiquita maintains that it only paid militias to protect employees and that Chiquita should not be 
held responsible for the tragic violence that has plagued Colombia.12 Chiquita aided the AUC 
because it benefitted from the AUC’s pacification of the banana-growing regions and the 
suppression of labor, union activity and other social unrest that could have harmed Chiquita’s 
operations.13 
This note argues that the dissent in Cardona was correct in that the connections to the 
United States displaced the presumption against extraterritoriality. Chiquita is incorporated and 
headquartered in the United States and Chiquita’s participation in reviewing, approving, and 
concealing a scheme of payments and weapons shipments to a Colombian terrorist organization 
all took place from its United States based corporate offices. Part II of this note will discuss the 
foundation of ATS litigation, beginning with enactment of the 1789 Judiciary Act through the 
Kiobel decision. Additionally, Part III will outline the growing split amongst circuit courts and 
analyze their disparate application of Kiobel. Finally, Part IV will examine Cardona by 
reconsidering the dissent and exploring the divergent treatment of corporate liability and aiding 
and abetting liability under the ATS and their relevance to the reexamination of Cardona, as well 
as certain international and human rights doctrinal debates which are implicated through ATS 
litigation. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
                                                 
12 Erik Larson & Christie Smythe, Chiquita Wins Dismisssal of U.S. Suits on Colombia Torture, 
BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (July 25, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-07-24/chiquita-wins-
dismissal-of-u-dot-s-dot-suits-over-colombia-torture.  
13 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, 10–13, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-
14898) (Through this strategic alliance, Chiquita was able to eliminate union organizers and others it perceived as 
hostile to its interests, and whom the AUC perceived as guerilla sympathizers, reduce operating costs, and eliminate 
disruptions and competition.). 
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The ATS was enacted in 1789 as part of the Judiciary Act that established the federal 
court system, in order to grant the national government control over foreign affairs.14 However, 
the ATS, in effect, lay dormant and was essentially ignored for over two centuries, until its 
revival in 1980 by way of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala,15 and the rapid expansion of the human rights movement in the late twentieth century.16 
A.  Revival of the ATS: Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 
Filartiga concerns the fatal kidnapping and torture of Joelito Filartiga in Paraguay in 
1976, by Americo Peña-Irala, a Paraguayan police officer, in retaliation for the human rights 
advocacy and political beliefs of Joelito’s father, a Paraguayan physician and activist. Dr. 
Filartiga commenced a criminal action in the Paraguayan courts against Pena, unaware that Pena 
had fled to the U.S..17 Joelito’s sister, who was then living in Washington, D.C., caused Pena to 
be served with a complaint that Pena had wrongfully caused the death of her brother by torture.18 
The district court dismissed the case holding that, although official torture violates the norm of 
customary international law, the court was constrained by dicta contained in two recent opinions 
of the court which construed narrowly that the law did not apply to the state’s torture of its own 
citizens.19 
During the six months in which the Filartiga appeal was pending, the Iran Hostage Crisis 
occurred, in which Iranian students took hundreds of U.S. citizens hostage and seized the U.S. 
                                                 
14 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 
20, s 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), codified at 28 U.S.C. s 1350. 
15 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
16 Id. at 880 (referring to the ATS as a “rarely-invoked provision”); See also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 
1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (calling the ATS “a kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first 
Judiciary Act, s 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789), no one seems to know whence it came”). 
17 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878–79. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 880 (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d. 24 (2d Cir. 1976); IIT v. Vencap, LTD., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 
1975)).  
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embassy in Tehran four over fourteen months, in response to the decision to permit the exiled 
Shah to receive medical treatment in New York. The impact of this national crisis on the court’s 
deliberations was discussed in the memoirs of the judicial clerk who drafted the Filartiga 
decision as a tense choice between national ideals and national interests.20  
The Executive branch filed an amicus brief supporting the Filartiga’s view that the ATS 
provided jurisdiction over their claim because the ATS incorporates an evolving body of 
international law, the judiciary had the authority to decide the case despite foreign affairs 
implications, that international law affords individual rights that can be directly enforced in 
domestic courts, and that litigation in Paraguay would not be possible.21 Less than a month after 
the Executive branch filed its brief, the court in Filartiga held that the official torture is 
unambiguously prohibited by the law of nations, noting that the ultimate scope of the 
fundamental rights conferred by international law “will be subject to continuing refinement.”22 
Further, the court held that the ATS affords federal jurisdiction for adjudication over claims that 
violate universally accepted norms of international law.23 
B. Cautious Optimism: Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic 
After Filartiga the first judicial response came in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,24 
where the court agreed that the claims alleging ATS jurisdiction based on acts of terrorism—
specifically an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel—should be dismissed, but disagreed as to 
the reasoning illustrated by the three separate concurring opinions.25 Judge Edwards largely 
                                                 
20 Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1467, 1481 (2014).  
21 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980) 
(No. 79-6090).  
22 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (2d. Cir. 1980) (concluding that the dictum in Dreyfus v. von Finck relied on by the 
district court “is clearly out of tune with the current usage and practice of international law”). 
23 Id. at 887. 
24 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
25 Compare Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring) with Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823 (Robb, J., 
concurring). 
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adhered to the legal principles established in Filartiga, but found that factual distinctions 
precluded a finding of subject matter jurisdiction and Judge Robb would have dismissed the case 
on political question grounds.26  
 Further, Judge Bork insisted that the federal courts had no power to recognize a cause of 
action for the claims at issue in either Filartiga or Tel-Oren because such a cause of action 
would intrude upon the foreign affairs powers of the executive branch, as these claims could not 
possibly have been what the drafters of the ATS intended.27 Judge Bork’s critical response to 
Filartiga stemmed from a formalist notion of separation of powers that, implicitly, reject the 
vision of the ATS as a mechanism for developing international law norms.28 
C. Affirmation of Modern ATS Litigation: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
 In 2004, the Supreme Court made its first pronouncement on the ATS in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain,29 which determined that the ATS was purely jurisdictional, and “is best read 
as having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of 
action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability 
at the time.”30 Additionally, the Court held that the jurisdictional grant of the ATS took effect 
from the moment of its enactment, as it was not passed “to be place on the shelf for use by a 
future Congress or state legislature.”31  
 Sosa involved a Drug and Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) agent who was captured on 
assignment in Mexico, tortured and killed.32 Based on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials 
believed Alvarez, a Mexican physician, was present at the house to prolong the agent’s life in 
                                                 
26 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776. 
27 Id. at 798-823 (Bork, J., concurring). 
28 Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
29 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
30 Id. at 724. 
31 Id. at 719 (“The anxieties of the pre-constitutional period cannot be ignored easily enough to think that the statute 
was not meant to have a practical effect”).  
32 Id. at 697.  
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order to extend the interrogation and torture.33 When requests for help to the Mexican 
government proved fruitless, the DEA successfully executed a plan to hire Mexican nationals to 
seize Alvarez and bring him to the U.S. for trial.34 However, Alvarez returned to Mexico and 
began a civil action against Sosa, several DEA agents, Mexican civilians and the U.S. after the 
Supreme Court found that Alvarez’s forcible seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal 
court.35 
 Although the Supreme Court asserted that district courts would recognize private causes 
of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations, the Court restrained the discretion 
that district courts should exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind.36 The 
Supreme Court required that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations rest on a norm 
of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity 
comparable to the features of the eighteenth century paradigms,” which include violation of safe 
conducts, infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.37 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
reasoned that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to 
lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, does not violate customary international law norms 
so well defined as to support the create of a federal remedy.38 
D. Limiting Extraterritoriality: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
The source of most modern ATS debate surrounds the holding of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company39, which virtually brought all pending ATS litigation to a halt.40 The 
                                                 
33 Id. at 697. 
34 Id. at 698. 
35 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 698 (2004). 
36 Id. at 725. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 738. 
39 133 U.S. 1659 (2013). 
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plaintiffs in Kiobel were Nigerian nationals who now reside in the Untied States as legal 
residents after seeking political asylum from alleged atrocities.41  The plaintiffs claimed that 
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian government in 
committing violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.42  More specifically, the complaint alleges 
that the Nigerian military and police forces attacked Plaintiffs’ villages, beating, raping, killing, 
and arresting residents and destroying or looting property after Plaintiffs began protesting the 
environmental effects of Royal Dutch Petroleum’s oil exploration and production in the region.43  
The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision was fractured by four distinct opinions.44  
The majority of the Court, lead by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), held that courts exercising their power under the ATS are 
constrained by the presumption against extraterritorial application.45 The presumption against 
extraterritoriality provides that, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none,” and to rebut the presumption, a statute would need to demonstrate a 
“clear indication of extraterritoriality.”46 Although the Court originally granted certiorari to 
consider whether the law of nations recognizes corporate liability, the majority reasoned that the 
Kiobel plaintiffs’ claims were barred because the events occurred on the soil of a foreign 
sovereign state and thus, none of the conduct took place within U.S. jurisdiction.47 As Chief 
                                                                                                                                                             
40 Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the Future of Alien Tort Litigation, 
FORBES (April 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2013/04/18/supreme-court-observations-
kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-future-of-alien-tort-litigation/.   
41 Kiobel, at 1663. 
42 Id. at 1662.  
43 Id. at 1662–63. 
44 Id. at 1659. 
45 Id. at 1662. 
46 Id. (quoting Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); See also EEOC v. Arabian American 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (This presumption “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws 
and those of other nations which could result in international discord”).  
47 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1662 (2013) (After oral argument, the Supreme Court 
directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing an additional question: “Whether and under what 
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Justice Roberts acknowledges, the presumption against extraterritoriality is typically used to 
discern whether the substantive content of laws applies abroad, and is not utilized to determine 
jurisdictional issues, like the ATS, which does not regulate conduct or afford relief.48 
Although the Court in Kiobel found that all the relevant conduct took place outside the 
U.S., the Court also stated in pertinent part that, “even where the claims touch and concern the 
territory of the U.S., they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
exterritorial application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too 
far to say mere corporate presence suffices.”49 The majority opinion, however, gives no 
indication of what may constitute sufficient contact to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, and this lack of clarity is lamented in the concurring opinions.50  
Justice Kennedy’s deciding fifth vote is accompanied by a concise and explicit opinion, 
in which Kennedy agreed with the Court’s narrow holding tailored to the case at hand.51 
Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that extraterritorial human rights abuses 
committed abroad where neither the Kiobel holding nor a statute, such as the Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”), are applicable, “proper implementation of the presumption 
against extraterritorial application may require some further elaboration and explanation.”52 
 Justice Alito argued in his concurrence that causes of action under the ATS should be 
barred unless the domestic conduct violates an international law norm sufficient to meet the Sosa 
                                                                                                                                                             
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring 
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United States.”).  
48 Id. at 1664; see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The door remains open to “foreign squared” 
cases, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-
remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/ (calling the presumption against extraterritoriality an “odd fit” in the ATS 
context).  
49 Kiobel, at 1669. 
50 Id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the majority’s narrow approach leaves much unanswered). 
51 Id. at 1671 (Kennedy J., concurring). 
52 Id. at 1671–72 (Kennedy J., concurring); 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).  
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requirements of definitiveness and acceptance among nations.53 Since none of the acts in Kiobel 
took place domestically, Justice Alito would find the claim barred by the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.54 
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer rejects invoking the presumption against 
extraterritoriality because it “rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with 
respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”55 Under Justice Breyer’s test, there would be 
jurisdiction under the ATS where: “(1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil, (2) the 
defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely 
affects an important American national interest, and that includes a distinct interest in preventing 
the U.S. from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or 
other common enemy of mankind”56 Further, Justice Breyer relied on Sosa to determine the 
extent to which the courts may permit ATS claims of those harmed by activities that take place 
abroad and provides much needed guidance to the majority’s standard.57  
While the first prong of the Breyer test is not controversial, as it is a literal translation of 
the touch and concern test, the second and third prongs present the possibility of divergence from 
the majority standard.58  Ultimately, Breyer agreed with the majority and concluded that the 
plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel did not fall within the jurisdictional view, since neither the plaintiffs 
nor the defendants were U.S. citizens, the conduct occurred abroad, and there was no distinct 
                                                 
53 Id. at 1662 (Alito, J., concurring). 
54 Id. 
55 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1671–72 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)). 
56 Id. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
57 Id. at 1672, 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that Congress has not sought to limit the statute’s jurisdictional 
or substantive reach in the wake of Sosa).  
58 Compare Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669 with Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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U.S. interest present in the case, the plaintiffs’ claims in Kiobel did not fall within this 
jurisdictional view.59 
After Kiobel, in 2014, the Supreme Court created an additional hurdle against 
transnational businesses in U.S. courts. In Daimler AG v. Bauman,60 the Court held that due 
process did not permit the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation that is not 
headquartered or incorporated within its jurisdiction.61 The case involved a claim by foreign 
plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based on events that occurred entirely outside the United 
States.62 However, the significance of Bauman is still indeterminable as a result of the unsettled 
standard of the Kiobel. On the one hand, Kiobel may limit the consequences of Bauman and on 
the other, Bauman could become another significant barrier. 
III. KIOBEL AFTERMATH: ANALYSIS OF THE GROWING SPLIT  
This part will evaluate the growing split amongst circuit courts in light of the minimal 
guidance provided by the Kiobel decision. Since Kiobel’s issuance, courts have uniformly 
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to all ATS litigation, although circuit courts 
have employed the presumption, and its ancillary touch and concern test, in both narrow and 
broad fashions. As courts continue to decipher Kiobel, questions of what allegations are 
sufficient to satisfy the touch and concern requirement and issues of corporate liability remain 
unresolved.63  
                                                 
59 Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1678 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
60 134 S.Ct. 746 (2014). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 751. 
63 Ralph G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Multiple Futures of Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations, 28 MD. 
J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2013) ([G]iven the level of public interest in the case and the extensive briefing, it was a shock that 
the Kiobel Court was utterly silent on whether corporations even in principle can have international obligations to 
respect human rights norms.”). 
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The Supreme Court in Kiobel relied heavily on Morrison v. National Australia Bank,64 
which established the principal that, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”65  Nonetheless, Kiobel did not sign a death sentence for 
the ATS because it only eliminated from future ATS litigation those ATS actions discussed in 
Morrison: “foreign cubed” ATS actions in which (1) foreign plaintiffs are suing (2) a foreign 
defendant in an American court for conduct that took place entirely within (3) foreign territory.66 
Therefore, “foreign squared” cases, where the plaintiff or defendant is a U.S. national or where 
the conduct occurred on U.S. soil may still be “on the table”.67 Chief Justice Roberts leaves the 
door open for extraterritorial ATS cases.68 However, in the entirety of the Kiobel majority 
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts references the “touch and concern” exactly once, leaving many 
questions as to what specifically the test entails.69  
A. Misguided Clarity: Kiobel’s Phantom Bright Line Rule 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in Balintulo v. Daimler AG70 that, where 
plaintiffs have failed to allege that any relevant conduct occurred in the U.S., Kiobel foreclosed 
the plaintiff’s ATS claims.71  In Balintulo, South African victims of apartheid brought suits 
against corporate defendants, including Daimler, Ford, and IBM, for aiding and abetting 
                                                 
64 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
65 Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1661 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261). 
66 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247, 283 n. 11 (emphasis added); see Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The door 
remains open to “foreign squared” cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases/.  
67 Hathaway, supra note 66.  
68 Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669; Hathaway, supra note 66. 
69 Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669 (“And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. . . .  Corporations are 
often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.”) (internal 
citations omitted).  
70 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013). 
71 Id. at 189.  
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violations of customary international law committed by the South African government.72 The 
court pointedly rejected the Plaintiff’s argument that, although “mere corporate presence” is 
inadequate to “touch and concern” the U.S. with “sufficient force,” corporate citizenship in the 
U.S. is satisfactory.73 Nevertheless, the court did not address the factual distinctions of corporate 
citizenship from mere corporate presence.74 The court reiterates that the relevant conduct 
occurred in South Africa, consciously ignoring the “touch and concern” element of the 
majority’s opinion in Kiobel and maintaining that the court had “no reason to explore, less 
explain, how courts should proceed when some of the relevant conduct occurs in the Untied 
States.”75  
The Second Circuit adopts the view expressed by Justice Alito’s concurrence in Kiobel, 
although the court also acknowledges that the Supreme Court neither adopted Justice Alito’s 
reasoning nor rejected it, rather, “the majority simply left open any questions regarding the 
permissible reach of cause of action under the ATS when some domestic activity is involved in 
the case.”76  However, the same conclusion can be reached concerning Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence, which would have allowed jurisdiction since the defendant is an American 
national.77  Curiously, the court in Balintulo cites Kiobel in support of Second Circuit precedent 
that corporations are not proper defendants under the ATS, when it is unmistakable that the case 
                                                 
72 Id. at 179–80 (Plaintiffs claim that these subsidiary companies sold cars and computers to the South African 
government and consequently facilitated the apartheid regime’s innumerable race-based injustices, rapes, tortures, 
and extrajudicial killings).  
73 Id. at 189–90 (“Accordingly, if all relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under 
Kiobel).  
74 Id. at 191. 
75 Id. 
76 Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 191 n. 26 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. 
Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) (applying Kiobel to foreclose jurisdiction over ATS claims 
filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was detained and tortured by the Bangladesh National Police at the 
direction of his Bangladeshi business partner). 
77 Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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was decided on other grounds.78 The court simultaneously denied that the Apartheid victims had 
alleged any relevant U.S.-based conduct, while also ignoring their allegations that Defendants 
took affirmative steps in the United States to circumvent the sanctions regime, and supplied the 
South African government with their products, notwithstanding legal restriction against trade 
with South Africa.79 The Second Circuit held that this U.S.-based conduct was not tied to the 
relevant human rights violations.80  
The Eleventh Circuit has reached similar conclusions.81 In Baloco v. Drummond 
Company,82 the court concluded that the claimed violations of the law of nations did not meet the 
touch and concern test established by Kiobel and thus, did not displace the presumption and the 
claims were subsequently dismissed.83  The plaintiffs alleged that Drummond Company, a 
closely held corporation with its principal place of business in Alabama, operated a coal mining 
operation in Columbia that aided and abetted or conspired with the Autodefensas Unidas de 
Columbia (“AUC”) by directly funding some of its operations.84 Plaintiffs also alleged that 
Drummond collaborated with the AUC to commit murders, which occurred in the context of an 
armed conflict between the AUC and FARC, a leftist guerilla organization, and hence, Plaintiffs 
classify the murders as war crimes.85 The Eleventh Circuit found that since the extrajudicial 
killings and war crimes alleged in the complaint occurred in Columbia, the conduct was not 
sufficient to warrant the extraterritorial application of the ATS, notwithstanding that Drummond 
                                                 
78 Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 191 n. 26. 
79 Id. at 192. 
80 Id. 
81 See generally Jaramillo v. Naranjo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138887 (stating that the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a 
narrow reading of post-Kiobel ATS jurisdiction that focused primarily on the territorial location of the allegations). 
82 767 F.3d 1229 (2014). 
83 Id. at 1235. 
84 Id. at 1233. 
85 Id. at 1234 (explaining that the AUC is an organization affiliated with Colombia’s military and which provided 
security against guerilla attacks for Drummond’s coal mining facility and operations). 
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was a U.S. national.86  However, unlike Kiobel which did not involve a U.S. corporate national 
or any defendant conduct that occurred within the United States, the court in Baloco admitted 
“these murders ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States’ (because of Drummond’s 
alleged involvement).”87 Nonetheless, the court ruled that the “claims are not focused within the 
United States” and thus, failed to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.88  
Furthermore, the court denied Plaintiffs’ request for remand, which would have allowed that 
district court cto consider Plaintiff’s request to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel.89  
B. Touch and Concern as a Fact Based Analysis 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc.90 
held that the plaintiff’s claims, which alleged that a U.S. corporation tortured and mistreated 
Iraqi citizens during their detention at the Abu Gharib prison in Iraq as suspected enemy 
combatants, touched and concerned the territory of the United States with sufficient force to 
displace the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS.91 Due to a shortage of 
trained military interrogators, the United States hired CACI Premier Technology, Inc. (“CACI”), 
a corporation domiciled in Virginia, to provide private interrogators.92 Plaintiff’s alleged that 
CACI employees instigated, directed, participated in, encouraged, and aided and abetted conduct 
towards the detainees and that CACI’s managers failed to investigate or to report accusations of 
                                                 
86 Id. at 1236. (stating that the issue is not whether the murders “touch and concern” the United States, as plaintiffs 
suggest, but rather whether the murders “touch and concern the territory of the United States.”) (citing Kiobel, 133 
U.S. at 1669).  
87 Id. at 1237–38 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. 247). 
88 Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1238 (2014) (explaining that the extraterritoriality inquiry turns on 
where the transaction that is the focus of the statute at issue occurred) (emphasis in original). 
89 Id. at 1239. 
90 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). 
91 Id. at 520 (4th Cir. 2014). “Photos depicting abuse of Abu Ghraib detainees emerged in 2004. Some detainees 
claimed they endured physical and sexual abuse, infliction of electric shocks, and mock executions.” Jonathan 
Stempel, Abu Ghraib torture lawsuit revived by U.S. appeals court, REUTERS (June 30, 2014 2:10 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/us-abughraib-caci-idUSKBN0F51BK20140630.  
92 Id. 
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wrongdoing and repeatedly denied that any CACI employees had engaged in abusive conduct.93 
The Fourth Circuit maintains that the clear implication of the Supreme Court’s “touch and 
concern” language is that the court should not assume that the presumption categorically bars 
cases that manifest a close connection to U.S. territory; rather, “a fact-based analysis is required 
in such cases to determine whether courts may exercise jurisdiction over certain ATS claims.”94  
In evaluating the “touch and concern” requirement, the court evaluated several factors, 
namely CACI’s “having won U.S. government permission to conduct interrogations and obtain 
security clearances, and allegations that CACI managers in the United States acquiesced in, or 
concealed, misconduct.”95  By distinguishing the attenuated connection to the United States 
territory reflected by the facts in Kiobel to the allegations of torture committed by U.S. citizens 
who were employed by a U.S. corporation in Al Shimari, the court was able to conclude that 
these claims surpass the “mere corporate presence” which was fatal in Kiobel, in order to 
overcome the presumption of extraterritoriality.96 The court observed that “mechanically 
applying the presumption to bar these ATS claims would not advance the purposes of the 
presumption,” since the plaintiffs in Al Shimari sought to enforce the customary law of nations 
against torture and the case did not present any potential problems associated with bringing 
foreign nationals into U.S. courts to answer for conduct committed abroad, given that the 
defendants are U.S. citizens.97 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit employs the “touch 
                                                 
93 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520–22. 
94 Id. at 528–29 (considering a broader range of facts than the location where the plaintiffs actually sustained their 
injuries).  
95 Stempel, supra note 91. 
96 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 528. 
97 Id. at 529–30  (“A basic premise of the presumption against extraterritorial application is that United States courts 
must be wart of international discord resulting from unintended clashes between our laws and those of other 
nations.”) (citing Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304, 322–24 (D.Mass. 2013) (holding that 
Kiobel did not bar ATS claims against an American citizen, in part because “[t]his is not a case where a foreign 
national is being hailed into an unfamiliar court to defend himself”). 
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and concern” test “by considering a broader range of facts than just the location where the 
plaintiffs actually sustained their injuries.”98  
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc.,99 similarly 
rejected a blanket ruling against extraterritoriality and in light of Kiobel’s ambiguous “touch and 
concern” standard, and remanded the case for further proceedings.100  The plaintiffs were three 
victims of child slavery who allege that Nestlé and other defendants “aided and abetted child 
slavery by providing assistance to Ivorian farmers.”101 The court reasoned that: 
[d]espite their knowledge of child slavery and their control over the cocoa market, 
the defendants operate in the Ivory Coast ‘with the unilateral goal of finding the 
cheapest sources of cocoa.’ The defendants continue to supply money, equipment, 
and training to Ivorian farmers, knowing that these provisions will facilitate the 
use of forced child labor.102  
 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument to apply the Morrison “focus test,” noting 
that while the test may be informative, Kiobel did not explicitly adopt the “focus test,” 
and instead chose “touch and concern” when articulating the legal standard.103  
IV. REEXAMINATION OF CARDONA 
A. Majority 
                                                 
98 Id. at 529; but see Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 45–46, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(applying Kiobel to foreclose jurisdiction over ATS claims filed by a Bangladeshi plaintiff who allegedly was 
detained and tortured by the Bangladesh National Police at the direction of his Bangladeshi business partner). 
99 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014). 
100 Id. at 1028 (“Rather than attempt to apply the amorphous touch and concern test on the record currently before 
us, we conclude that the plaintiffs should have the opportunity to amend their complaint in light of Kiobel”). 
101 Id. at 1016–17 (“They were forced to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up to fourteen hours per day six days 
a week, given only scraps of food to eat, and whipped and beaten by overseers. They were locked in small rooms at 
night and not permitted to leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be beaten or 
tortured. Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who attempted to escape, and John Doe 
III knew that the guards forced failed escapees to drink urine.”) 
102 Id. at 1017–18 (noting that defendants have also lobbied against congressional efforts to curb the use of child 
slave labor). 
103 Id. at 1028 (citing Morrison, 130 U.S. at 2284 (the focus test states that a cause of action falls outside the 
presumption against extraterritoriality only if the events or relationships that are the focus of congressional concern 
in the relevant statute occur within the United States)); Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669. See Mark J. Mullaney, Ninth 
Circuit Allows Child Slaves to Amend Complaint to Satisfy New Kiobel Standard, INT’L RIGHTS ADVOCATES (Sept. 
26, 2014 12:16 PM), http://www.iradvocates.org/blog/ninth-circuit-allows-child-slaves-amend-complaint-satisfy-
new-kiobel-standard (“The court rejected the Defendants’ calls to directly apply the restrictive Morrison “focus” 
test, observing that Kiobel explicitly avoided using the terms of art found in Morrison.”).    
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On interlocutory review, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the 
complaints did not state claims within the jurisdiction of the United States courts.104  The court 
did not address the specific questions that were certified for review.105  The court acknowledged 
that the Supreme Court acted with respect to the ATS during the pendency of this appeal and 
drew a similarity between Kiobel and Cardona with respect to actions by a corporation in 
conjunction with paramilitary actors within a foreign territory.106  In reaching its holding, the 
majority maintained that the distinction between the corporation in Kiobel, which was present in 
the United States, and the corporation in Cardona, a U.S. corporation, did not lead to “any 
indication of a congressional intent to make the statute apply to extraterritorial torts . . . ‘[i]f 
Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS would be 
required.’”107 Thus, the court plainly concluded, “[t]here is no other statute. There is no 
jurisdiction.”108 According to the majority, Chiquita’s U.S. citizenship is completely irrelevant to 
the ATS evaluation.109 
The court rationalized its holding by noting the history of the ATS, namely Sosa, 
precluded the court from applying the ATS to the allegations in Cardona.110 In evaluating the 
touch and concern test, the majority stated without further explanation that, “[t]here is no 
allegation that any torture occurred on U.S. territory, or that any other act constituting a tort in 
terms of the ATS touched or concerned the territory of the United States with any force.”111 
Consequently, as the murders at the center of the plaintiffs’ allegations took place in Colombia, 
                                                 
104 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1187 (11th Cir. 2014). 
105 Id. at 1188 (“Because we conclude that neither this court nor the district court has jurisdiction over the action, we 
untimely will not answer those specific questions . . .”). 
106 Id. at 1189. 
107 Id. (quoting Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669). 
108 Id. 
109 See generally Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014). 
110 Id. at 1190. 
111 Id. at 1191. 
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the majority chose not to apply the touch and concern test at all, reflecting an extremely 
restrictive version of the test advocated by Justice Alito’s concurrence in Kiobel.112 However, 
many have criticized the ruling as impudent in light of the facts and the infamous legacy of 
Chiquita’s operations in developing nations.113 The majority did not address, let alone consider, 
the allegations of U.S.-based aiding and abetting or that Chiquita’s actions were U.S. crimes 
under anti-terrorism laws.114 
B. Dissent 
The dissent argues in the alternative, that facts of Cardona are sufficient to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.115  First, the primary defendant is Chiquita Brands 
International, a corporation headquartered and incorporated within the territory of the United 
States.116  Second, Chiquita “participated in a campaign of torture and murder in Columbia by 
reviewing, approving, and concealing a scheme of payments and weapons shipments to 
Columbian terrorist organizations, all from their corporate offices in the territory of the United 
States.”117 Chiquita’s U.S.-based officials took substantial measures to conceal these payments 
over and over again by issuing checks payable to individual employees who would endorse the 
checks, convert them to cash, and then deliver the funds to the AUC.118 Through this analysis of 
touch and concern test, Judge Martin found that the plaintiffs met the Kiobel standard. 
                                                 
112 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 133 U.S. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito, J., concurring). 
113 Cohen, supra note 9. “This opinion is shockingly negligent in terms of just actually dealing with the facts and 
dealing with the issues. . . . It’s almost flippant in terms of just gleefully throwing the case out.” Id. (quoting Terry 
Collingsworth, one of the chief litigators for the Chiquita victims, in an interview with Think Progress). 
114 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 7463974 
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-777).  
115 Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 7463974 
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-777). 
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The dissent distinguished the facts from Kiobel by noting that plaintiffs do not rely on 
Chiquita’s “mere corporate presence” to justify ATS jurisdiction, as it is incorporated in New 
Jersey and headquartered in Ohio.119  This case is not a case where a defendant is being haled 
into court under the ATS for action that took place on foreign soil or which plaintiffs are seeking 
to circumvent the presumption against extraterritoriality by holding an American company 
vicariously liable for the unauthorized action of its subsidiaries overseas.120  Thus, the dissent 
concluded that the touch and concern test is satisfied when a defendant aids and abets overseas 
torts from within the United States.121 Judge Martin derided the court’s unwillingness to enforce 
the ATS and by doing so, “we disarm innocents against American corporations that engage in 
human rights violations abroad. I understand the ATS to have been deliberately crafted to avoid 
this regrettable result.”122   
C. Distinguishing Kiobel and Cardona 
Through its mechanically application of Kiobel in Cardona, the Eleventh Circuit ignored 
the major distinctions between the two cases.123  In Kiobel, all of the atrocities were alleged to 
have been committed in Nigeria, the defendants were Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations, 
and there only relevant connection to the U.S. consisted of their corporate listing on the New 
York Stock Exchange and their affiliation with a public relations office in New York.124 
                                                 
119 Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1192 (Martin, J., dissenting). 
120 Id. at 1194. 
121 Id. at 1194–95 (Martin, J., dissenting). See, e.g. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 
2014); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F.Supp.2d 304 (D.Mass. 2013); Mwani v. Laden 947 F. Supp. 2d 1 
(D.D.C. 2013); Krishanti v. Rajaratnam, 2014 WL 1669873 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2014). 
122 Cardona, 760 F. 3d at 1195 (Martin, J., dissenting); Lauren Carasik, The uphill battle to hold US corporation 
accountable for abuses abroad, ALJAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 8, 2014 6:00 AM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/chiquita-corporateaccountabilityunitednationshumanrights.html.  
123 Press Release, International Rights Advocates, Eleventh Circuit Decision in Chiquita Tort Status Litigation (July, 
25, 2014), http://www.iradvocates.org/press-release/chiquita/press-release-eleventh-circuit-decision-chiquita-alien-
tort-status-litigation.  
124 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1677 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Paul L. 
Hoffman, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: First Impressions, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 28, 31 (2013) 
 21 
“Moreover, none of the defendants had engaged in any activities in the U.S. that appeared to be 
relevant to the claimed tortious acts that occurred in Nigeria.”125 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the approach of the Second Circuit and 
held in Cardona that the “ATS contains nothing to rebut the presumption against 
extraterritoriality” and thus, since the conduct, namely torture and death, occurred in Columbia, 
the ATS is inapplicable.126  Unlike Kiobel, Chiquita is incorporated in New Jersey and 
headquartered in Ohio, and the United States may regulate its own corporations and bears 
responsibility for their acts under international law.127  Plaintiffs sought to hold Chiquita liable 
for conduct that occurred in the United States, namely that they made one hundred separate 
payments to the AUC that it reviewed, approved, and directed at the highest corporate levels 
from its U.S. headquarters.128  Distinct from the facts in Kiobel, Chiquita actively participated in 
a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia by reviewing, approving and concealing a scheme 
of payments and weapons shipments to Colombia terrorist organization, all from their corporate 
offices in the United States.129  Plaintiffs did not seek to circumvent the presumption against 
extraterritoriality by holding Chiquita vicariously liable for the unauthorized actions of its 
subsidiaries in Columbia. Chiquita was directly a participant in “widespread and systematic 
human rights violations with indisputable evidence of actions taken by Chiquita in the United 
                                                                                                                                                             
(“Though the Court reformulated the question presented broadly, the application of the ATS to such so-called 
‘foreign-cubed’ cases was at the heart of most of the briefing and argument). 
125 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 526 (4th Cir. 2014). 
126 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2014). 
127 Id.; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-
14898). 
128 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898). 
129 Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1992 (Martin, J., dissenting) (concluding that plaintiff’s claims sufficiently “touch and 
concern” the territory of the United States because they allege the Chiquita violation international law from within 
the U.S. by offering substantial assistance to a campaign of violence abroad).  
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States.”130 If Kiobel represents the end of the spectrum where the only connection to the United 
States was mere corporate presence, Cardona falls on the opposite end, representing substantial 
and repeated connections with the United States.  
The majority applies a mechanical application of Kiobel, without considering a broader 
range of facts, and failing to advance the purposes of the presumption.131  The Eleventh Circuit 
pronounced: “because our ultimate disposition is not dependent on specificity of fact, we will 
only briefly review the history of the case.”132 The majority opinion in Kiobel did not assert that 
ATS only reaches domestic conduct—this interpretation appeared only in Justice Alito’s 
concurrence, where he acknowledge his approach was more restrictive.133 It is also significant 
that Chiquita pled guilty to providing support to the AUC, despite its designation as a terrorist 
organization that threatens U.S. national security.134  Thus, the U.S. government has concluding 
that providing support to the U.S. directly concerns vital national interests and violates U.S. 
foreign policy and criminal law.135  Thus, Cardona undermines U.S. foreign policy and does not 
reinforce international comity.136 
The dissent in Cardona reasoned that Kiobel should not be read as “an impediment to 
civilians harmed by a decades-long campaign of terror they plainly allege to have been 
                                                 
130 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 7463974 
(U.S. Dec. 30, 2014) (No. 14-777). 
131 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529-31 (4th Cir. 2014). 
132 Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1187–88. 
133 See generally Kiobel, 133 U.S. 1659 (2013); See also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. 516, 528 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
134 Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15, Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 760 F. 3d 1185 (2014) (No. 12-14898). 
135 Id. at 20. 
136 See, e.g Press Release, Department of Justice, Chiquita Brands International Pleads Guilty to Making Payments 
to a Designated Terrorist Organization And Agrees to Pay $25 Million Fine (Mar. 19, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_nsd_161.html (“The message to industry from this guilty plea today 
is that the U.S. Government will bring its full power to bear in the investigation of those who conduct business with 
designated terrorist organizations, even when those acts occur outside of the United States.”). 
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sponsored by an American corporation.”137 As the Second Circuit did in Balintulo, the Eleventh 
Circuit ignored sensitive facts in reaching its conclusion, namely, the panel did not explain how 
Chiquita’s support for terrorist could violate U.S. criminal law and undermine U.S. security, but 
not “touch and concern” the United States.138 At sentencing, the U.S. government emphasized 
the fact that Chiquita’s criminal acts caused the murders that arise out of the same nucleus of 
facts. Not only did Chiquita aid and abet crimes against humanity, they also interfered with the 
foreign policy of the United States, actions that should satisfy the touch and concern test and 
allows for ATS jurisdiction.  
D. Inconsistency with International Law 
To begin with, it is a fundamental principle of international law that every State has the 
sovereign authority to regulate the conduct of its own citizens, regardless of whether that conduct 
occurs inside or outside of the State's territory.139 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 
explicitly permits a state to exercise jurisdiction.140 Kiobel reaffirmed that the primary basis for 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is protection against “unintended clashes between our 
laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord” that “should make 
courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive branches 
in managing foreign affairs.”141 By flagrantly disregarding basic human rights, courts have failed 
to meet expectations of international community and respect rights universally proclaimed by all 
                                                 
137 Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Jonathan 
Stempel, Chiquita wins dismissal of U.S. lawsuits over Colombian abuses, Reuters (July 24, 2014, 3:28 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/chiquita-colombia-decision-idUSL2N0PZ28P20140724 (noting that in 
March 2007, Chiquita pleaded guilty to a U.S. criminal charge and paid a $25 million fine for having made 
payments from 1997 through February 2004 to the right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia, known in Spanish as AUC).  
138 See Exec. Order No. 12,224,31 C.F.R. 595097 (2001) (blocking transactions with terrorists deemed to “threaten 
the security of the U.S. national or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States”).  
139 See Restatement (Third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(2) (1987); see also Cardona v. 
Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
140 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §402(2) (1987). 
141 Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1664.  
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nations.142 Under international law and affirmed through the enactment of the ATS, the U.S. 
consciously accepted an obligation to remedy those injured by their own citizens.  
In Kiobel, foreign governments submitted amicus briefs that claimed the assertion of 
ATS jurisdiction over their corporations violated international law.143 These same concerns are 
inapplicable in Cardona, where the defendant is a U.S. citizen. In agreement, the United States 
argued that in their Kiobel brief that “the court should not articulate a categorical rule foreclosing 
any such application of the ATS” as the United States may be responsible under international 
law for the actions of U.S. citizens abroad.144 A corporation, incorporated and headquartered in 
the United States, which operates worldwide, supporting from the territory of the United States, 
the murder of thousands of men, women, and children is irrefutably a violation of international 
law.  
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by 
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right 
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, 
where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial 
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations, and, 
as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who by years of 
labor, research, and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted 
with the subjects of which they treat.145  
 
By flagrantly disregarding basic human rights, courts have failed to meet expectations of 
international community and respect rights universally proclaimed by all nations.146 
Responsibility for Chiquita’s callous actions lies with the Untied States.  
E. Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the ATS 
                                                 
142 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“Our holding today . . . is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless 
dream to free all people from brutal violence.”). 
143 See Brief of the European Comm'n on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 6, 24-28, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
144 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of Affirmance at 15, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
145 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
146 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“Our holding today . . . is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless 
dream to free all people from brutal violence.”). 
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Chiquita’s acts of aiding and abetting extra-judicial killings, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, which originated in the United States, are themselves torts in violation of the 
law of nations. Aiding and abetting is recognized as a valid basis for liability under the ATS and 
is a well-established norm of international law. “All international authorities agree that ‘at least 
purposive action . . . constitutes aiding and abetting,’” although there is conflict concerning 
whether the mens rea required for aiding and abetting claim is knowledge or purpose.147 For 
many ATS cases, the unresolved aiding and abetting standard could have great implications for 
actions against transnational corporate defendants, as the purpose test is a much higher standard 
than the knowledge test. 
Regardless of the standard, defendants in Chiquita may be held liable under ATS as a 
result of the theory of aiding and abetting. It is clear that Chiquita had knowledge that they were 
cooperating with the a known terrorist organization and repeatedly ignored counsel to end their 
relationship with the AUC. Chiquita acted with the purpose to violate the law by maintaining 
contact with and supporting the AUC financially in exchange for asserting dominance in the 
banana growing region.  
F. Corporate Liability Under the ATS 
There is no surprise that the question of the possibility of ATS litigation against 
corporations has attracted attention and inconclusive answers.148  The corporate accountability 
movement coupled with reservations of the potential impact on the business environment has 
lead to starkly divergent responses.149  The drastic growth of transnational business and 
                                                 
147 Id.; Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2014 WL 4746256 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2014). 
148 Hathaway, supra note 66 (“Those celebrating the demise of the ATS may thus find themselves surprised to 
discover that the end result of the Supreme Court’s decision yesterday may not be the end of the ATS after all, but 
instead a renewed focus of ATS litigation on U.S. corporations.”). 
149 See Nathan Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts from Overseas to U.S. Courts, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2009 
11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB125133677355962497 (noting that litigation has proven controversial). 
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globalization has created a safe haven for multinational corporations in both developed and 
underdeveloped countries that lack appropriate regulation. This section will argue that a 
defendant’s corporate identity should not be dispositive in deciding whether there is jurisdiction 
under the ATS. To hold otherwise, would be to immunize U.S. corporate entities operating in the 
developing world from “liability arising from their facilitation of torture, destruction of property, 
extra-judicial killing, and environmental catastrophes.”150  
One of the most prominent issues that the Supreme Court in Kiobel left unanswered was 
whether the law of nations recognizes corporate liability – whether multinational corporations 
can be held civilly liable under the ATS for their actions or the actions of their subsidiaries and 
agents.151 The only reference that the Supreme Court has made toward corporate liability under 
the ATS is a footnote in Sosa, where the Court directed federal courts contemplating the 
recognition of new ATS claims to consider “whether international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private 
actor such as a corporation or individual.”152 The court did not address criminal liability and 
some have questioned whether civil liability alone is an adequate response to “corporate 
participation in unimaginable crimes that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”153 
                                                 
150 Colin Kearney, Case Comment, International Human Rights—Corporate Liability Claims Not Actionable Under 
the Alien Tort Statute—Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 34 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 263, 270 (2011).  
151 Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1662. 
152 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n. 20 (2004) (referencing the contrasting decisions of the D.C. 
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153 James G. Stewart, The Turn to Corporate Criminal Liability for International Crimes: Transcending the Alien 
Tort Statute, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 121, 179 (2014) (arguing coupling corporate criminal liability with 
international crimes in national systems is the next obvious “discovery” in corporate responsibility). 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed three principles about ATS liability in Doe v. Nestle.154 First, 
the analysis proceeds norm-by-norm; there is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or 
liability.155 Second, corporate liability under an ATS claim does not depend on the existence of 
international precedent enforcing legal norms against corporations.156 Third, norms that are 
“universal and absolute,” or applicable to “all actors,” can provide the basis for an ATS claim 
against a corporation.157 To determine whether a norm is universal, we consider, among other 
things, whether it is “limited to states” and whether its application depends on the identity of the 
perpetrator. 158 The court concluded that three former child slaves could assert their ATS claim 
against corporate defendants, as the prohibition against slavery is universal and applies to state 
actors and non-state actors alike.159    
G. Human Rights Law 
ATS litigation has highlighted the need for corporations to manage and seriously consider 
any potential human rights violations, irrespective of an ultimate finding of liability.160 The 
European Commission in its amicus brief in Kiobel argues that, some wrongs, no longer limited 
to piracy and slave trading, are “so repugnant that all States have a legitimate interest and 
therefore have the authority to suppress and punish them.161  It is likely that in the wake of post-
                                                 
154 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 10-56739, 2014 WL 4358453 at *7 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (referencing Sarei v. Rio 
Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. 
Ct. 1995 (U.S. 2013)). 
155 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 10-56739, 2014 WL 4358453 at *7 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014).  
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157 Id. 
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159 Id. at *6–7. 
160 See generally Santiago A. Cueto, Alien Tort Claims Act: A Threat to U.S. Corporation Operating Overseas?, 
INT’L BUSINESS LAW ADVISOR (Oct. 9, 2009), 
http://www.internationalbusinesslawadvisor.com/2009/10/articles/international-litigation/alien-tort-claims-act-a-
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161 See Brief of the European Comm'n on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 16, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491). 
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Kiobel litigation, plaintiffs will focus heavily on forum shopping depending on the facts of each 
case and look for alternatives in transnational tort litigation.162 
Allowing U.S. defendants to be sued for human rights abuses advances the policy of 
denying safe haven.163 Filartiga underscores this importance; it paved the way to seek 
accountability in U.S. courts in order to permit suits against those defendants who enjoy 
protection of the U.S. legal system and whose egregious behavior is therefore a legitimate U.S. 
concern.164 Redress for human rights violations requires due diligence. Thus, it is not that the 
State guarantees a remedy or satisfaction for every violation, but instead, due diligence 
obligations are usually considered obligations of conduct. Due diligence compels institutions, 
such as the courts, to operate diligently and “[s]tates may incur responsibility if they are not 
diligent in pursuing and preventing acts contrary to international law by prosecuting and 
punishing the private perpetrators.”165 Nonetheless, human rights law does not bind non-state 
actors, although corporate due diligence considerations are developing.  
John Ruggie, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human 
Rights, is one of the most influential contributors to international relations, where he has 
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164 Id. at 24. 
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developed “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the Untied 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” (the “Ruggie Framework”).166 The Ruggie 
Framework has been called “the most comprehensive and authoritative global standard in the 
area of business and human rights.167 In September 2013, the United Kingdom became the first 
country to launch its implementation plan, which will guide companies on integrating human 
rights into their operations.168 The action plan demonstrates “important leadership in relation to 
the protection of human rights defenders working on issues of corporation accountability.”  Most 
notably, the action plan is intended to apply to UK companies operating both at home and 
extraterritorially, to integrate human rights in their operations.169 Further, amendments to the UK 
Companies Act has clarified that company directors will include human rights issues in their 
annual reports.170 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Cardona reflects a radically narrow interpretation of the standard set by the Supreme 
Court in Kiobel, in light of the facts surrounding the case, including the major distinctions 
between the two cases. In an effort to strengthen international and multinational corporate 
accountability, the U.S. and the Supreme Court cannot allow the growing power of multinational 
corporations to hinder the development of a standard and framework that can properly regulate 
the conduct of citizens, whether individuals or corporations, on foreign soil.  
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Courts should not disregard a claim against a U.S. national, whose conduct violates the 
law of nations, under the false pretext that the case mirrors Kiobel, thus preemptively barring the 
claim before evaluating the facts of the case. To apply an ambiguous and unsettled standard so 
restrictively is imprudent.  Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit’s failure in Cardona to address the 
factual allegations that the relevant conduct took place in the U.S., in order to determine if the 
conduct touched and concerned the U.S. sufficiently to displace the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is in direct contradiction with Kiobel and conflicts with other circuit courts.   
 
